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Abstract
Institutions, and the collective action that created them and which they enable, can play an important role in poverty eradication.
In Norway, the Raw Fish Act passed in 1938 in the aftermath of the international financial crisis that hit the fishing industry hard,
and the fishers’ cooperative sales-organizations that it authorized testify to this. Most of all, they helped to empower fishers in
their economic transactions throughout the value chain. Since the RFA’s enactment, it has undergone reform that has somewhat
changed the mandate of the sales-organizations, but the basic principles and functions remain. Although the historical context and
institutional designs of the Raw Fish Act and the cooperative sales-organizations that it mandated, are unique, together they
addressed a problem that small-scale fishers are experiencing in other parts of the world - one of poverty, marginalization and
exploitation. The Raw Fish Act and the system of mandated, cooperative sales-organizations radically altered this predicament
and turned the table in fishers’ favor. The question, therefore, is what lessons do the Norwegian example offer that might be
emulated elsewhere?
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Introduction
By the turn of the nineteenth century Norway was among the
poorest European nations. Only Greece and Portugal had a
lower income level than Norway (Cappelen and Røed
Larsen 2005). During the first two decades of the nineteenth
century, however, a process of economic and industrial mod-
ernisation took place, spurred on also by the First World War.
For the coastal economy, the war meant an increased demand
for Norwegian fish products by the main parties to the War,
Great Britain and Germany, resulting in a significant price rise
as a result. In the beginning of the 1920s the cycles turned
again. The situation worsened due to the financial meltdown
on Wall Street in 1928, hitting the export industries hard in-
cluding that of fish products, the country’s most important
export industry. As 90% of Norway’s fish products were
exported, fishing communities felt the impact heavily
(Christensen and Hallenstvedt 1990; Bull 1979).
Although fish resources were abundant, easily available
and open access, fishers still had problems earning a decent
income – even when export markets improved. Their poverty
was exacerbated by lack of bargaining power; buyers easily
exploited them by transferring their market losses to the fish-
ers who, as the weaker party, had to accept the terms offered to
them.When prices dropped, which could happen in the course
of a day, fishers had to work even harder and bring more fish
ashore to compensate for the loss. Ironically, this further de-
pressed prices. The situation reached a point where fishers,
with their backs to the wall, finally responded. They organized
collectively to break free of bondage (Hallenstvedt 1982:
Grytås 2013a).
The government supported the fisher initiative in several
ways. Most importantly, the Raw Fish Act (RFA) was passed
by Parliament in 1938. The Act granted the fishers’ coopera-
tive sales-organizations the exclusive right to decide a fixed
minimum level of the raw fish price. The Norwegian
Fishermen’s Sales-organization (NFSO) established the same
year as the passing of the RFA, together with a number of
other similar organizations throughout the country, has come
to play a crucial role in Norwegian fisheries and society. On
cannot understand the social and economic dynamics of the
fisheries industry and its governance without a thorough anal-
ysis of the Raw Fish Act and the sales-organizations. These
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institutions helped empower the fishing population by priori-
tizing their needs, enabling them to exit a discriminatory
bargaining situation, and overcome the hardships that the in-
ternational financial crisis had brought upon them. This legal
and organizational reform helped to bring the fishing popula-
tion of poverty, which in parts of the country, especially in the
most fisheries dependent northern region, was extreme. For a
decade prior to the reform, raw-fish cod prices had been way
below what they were before that period, whereas the cost of
living had increased (Christensen and Hallenstvedt 1990).
Child mortality in the 1920s and -30s were at a level more
extreme that in most developing countries today. In Finnmark,
the northernmost county, 112 per 1000 children died within
one year of birth (Rønning Balsvik and Drake 1994). In com-
parison, in 2015, 83 per thousand children in South-Saharan
Africa died (thechildeshttp://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
SH.DYN.MORT).
In this paper we tell the story about how the RFA came into
being; who initiated its drafting and why. In order to under-
stand the significance of this law we start by discussing some
key issues regarding cooperative organizations and collective
action as they appear in small-scale fisheries globally. If orga-
nizations are a solution to poverty, marginalization and disem-
powerment, what are the hurdles to their realization?
Cooperatives like the sales-organizations in Norwegian fish-
eries do not emerge spontaneously in a social and political
vacuum. Their origin and sustenance require some form of
collective action, either by way of a grassroots or external
initiative, namely from within civil society or government
supported, or perhaps preferably through concerted action in-
volving both. Organizing fishers is not always an easy chal-
lenge for reasons that may have to do with their need for
independence, lack of time and organizational skills
(Hallenstvedt 1982).
How was this challenge overcome in the case of
Norwegian fisheries? Who saw the need for legal and institu-
tional reform? Norway’s fishing industry looks very different
today in comparison to when the Raw Fish Act was passed
and the NFSO established more than 75 years ago. The Act
and NFSO’s survival has depended on their ability to stay
relevant to the changing circumstances of the industry by
adapting accordingly (Hersoug et al., 2015). What their future
holds, therefore, depends on them being able to stay relevant.
We argue that although institutional designs must be fish-
ery and country specific, the RFA and the cooperative sales-
organization should offer inspiration for similar institutional
reforms in other parts of the world. Norway is not a poor
country today, and neither are fishers. But when the RFA
saw the light of day, they were. The RFA resulted from a class
struggle, and was a bold move of the Parliament to empower
fishers and to release them from the bonds with the more
dominant buyers. These issues are valid beyond Norway.
Despite the fact that the Norwegian context is unique in many
ways and that its particular history must be taken into account,
the study describes a solution to a problem that exist elsewhere
in the world of small-scale fisheries.
Organization and collective action
The theory underpinning fisheries resource use and manage-
ment is essentially expressed as a Prisoner’s Dilemma game.
In this game, participants cannot avoid what Sartre (2006)
called “counterfinality”; when they act in their individual in-
terest, they underperform as a group. Individual and collective
rationality collides. People could accomplish more for them-
selves and for each other if they agree to put their own private
ambitions aside and work together for their common interest.
However, in the case of collective goods (i.e. those goods that
once they are provided cannot be reserved for anyone in par-
ticular) are concerned, it is always more profitable for individ-
uals to free ride, i.e. take advantage of being able to use the
good without contributing to its realization. Therefore, there
will be an undersupply of collective goods, unless someone is
willing to shoulder the burden, which in the absence of incen-
tives would have to be an external agent, like the state.
This problem is at the heat of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game
and the Tragedy of the Commons, the parable famously
discussed by Garrett Hardin (1968) and later Ostrom (1990).
In fisheries, this tragedy is overexploitation, ruin of the re-
source, and the destitution of the resource users. This outcome
is inevitable because users do what is rational from their indi-
vidual perspective. As Hardin observed (p. 1244), “Ruin is the
destination towards which all men rush, each pursuing his
own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of
the commons.”
Mancur Olson (1971) employed the same model for orga-
nizational formation and performance. While highlighting the
advantages of having organizations for the realization of a
collective good, he recognised that such organizations also
faced collective action problems and hence were subject to
the Prisoner’s Dilemma. This is a “second-order collective
action problem”, which needs to be resolved first, before
one can effectively address the problem at first order, like
sustaining the common resource (Holm 1995; Heckathorn
1989). For a member, an organization provides benefits but
also involves sacrifices, such as the willingness to contribute
and comply. Staying outside the organization or remaining
passive within it does not exclude one from enjoying the
goods that it provides, such as healthier resources or higher
prices.
Notably, the participants in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game
do not communicate or cooperate; rather they make their de-
cisions in isolation. In the real world, this is not necessarily the
case. For instance, within small groups or local communities,
people know each other, share history and identity. In such
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setting, people often make decisions together. They also have
the means to sanction penalties for deviating behaviour like
free riding. Here, counterfinality is, therefore, not inevitable;
self-organization is possible unless there is “community fail-
ure”; internal conflict, normlessness – or “anomie” as
Durkheim called it (McCay and Jentoft 1998).
Counterfinality is closely related to scale: The larger the
group, the lesser the incentive for individuals to self-organize,
and lesser the capacity for informal sanctioning as social rela-
tions are not intimate. People who do not know each other are
more likely to mistrust each other and less inclined to com-
municate and cooperate. In large groups that are not commit-
ted to agreements, breaking rules will be considered as
cheating, whereas, in small groups the same act will be con-
sidered as “betrayal”. A common political ideologymaymake
up for some of the deficit, as for example within the labour and
cooperative movements, but it may still be insufficient to
avoid free riding. Fisher-members may find it profitable to sell
their catch outside their cooperative (Davis and Jentoft 1989).
The RFA made such behaviour illegal.
These general considerations about organization and col-
lective action inform the organizational creation and structure
of Norwegian fisheries. They make it easier to understand
some of the essential challenges that confront any collective
action. However, we also need a full and detailed account of
what actually happened. In other words, to get the full picture,
a “thick description” of the contextual and causal mechanisms
that were active at a given point of time would be required
(Vayda 1996). We would need insight into the real events that
propelled people into collective action. That description fol-
lows in subsequent sections. For now, it is sufficient to point
out that the co-governance system of Norwegian fisheries
emerged in a crisis situation in the thirties that called for re-
form. This reform took years and finally resulted in a nation-
wide, coherent governance structure that involved fishers in
partnership with a proactive state that was willing to delegate
important management functions to cooperative sales-
organizations of fishers, one of them being NFSO. The free
rider problem was solved by giving NFSO and other fishers’
sales-organizations a monopoly status; selling fish outside
these organizations was deemed illegal, and persecuted if de-
tected. This could only happen due to the RFA and the general
legitimacy that the law enjoyed amongst Norwegian fishers.
The Raw Fish Act – A short history
To tell the story about the Raw Fish Act, we start by giving a
short historical account of the geographical, social, and eco-
nomic structures of Norwegian fisheries with special emphasis
on the northern region. In this part of Norway, due to the
Arctic climate, the conditions for agriculture are rather poor,
whereas fisheries resources are rich and available close to the
coast. In the three northern counties, Nordland, Troms and
Finnmark, the cod fisheries have always dominated. The sea-
sonal Lofoten fishery of spawning cod that migrates from the
Barents Sea has been the most important source of income.
These fisheries were always crucial for northern coastal
settlements. The total population in Norway in 1900 was 2.2
million, of whom only 35% lived in densely populated areas
(Statistics Norway, www.ssb.no). Fishing and smallholding –
or a combination of both – was still the main occupation for
the majority of the adult population in the coastal regions
despite the fact that the industrialisation process had already
started. In 1900, 82,000 people and 19,000 inshore and mid-
shore vessels, mostly powered by oars and sails, were in-
volved in the cod fisheries in the north (NOS 1901).With very
few exceptions, the Norwegian fisheries were a rural industry.
Fishers lived in small villages in the fjords and along the coast,
the household being the most important economic unit (Wadel
1980; Solhaug 1983). Coastal households fished partly for
subsistence, partly for cash.
Although fishers owned their vessels and gears themselves,
they were locked into relations of dependence with fish
buyers, which kept buyers in power and fishers in poverty.
Buyers could dictate the terms of the transaction. Often, there
were only one fish buyer in the local community; hence
existing buyers had monopsony status. Moreover, fishers
had no option, given the non-availability of other sources of
supply, but to purchase essential goods and services such as
flour, salt, sugar, gears, bait, etc. from buyers. Buyers were
also creditors and often land owners as well. It was in other
words a classic situation of a complex dependency relations
that is still typical for small-scale fishers in many parts of the
world.
It was easy for the buyers to control and exploit the poor
and often illiterate fishing population. One known method of
deceiving the fishers was to miscount the number of fish while
purchasing. The concept storhundra (big hundred) refers to
the common practice among fish buyers to pay the fishers for a
hundred fish when in reality they took more than that – like
one hundred and twenty. The extra twenty were simply not
counted.
Between 1900 and 1920, a technological revolution took
place in the Norwegian coastal fisheries with the arrival of the
combustion engine (Johansen 2014). This new technology
spread rapidly, after some initial scepticism amongst fishers,
and by the end of the 1920s most of the fleet was motorised.
The successful installation of engines in small-scale boats
stands in striking contrast to the non-adoption of steam trawler
technology within Norwegian fisheries.
The outcome, therefore, of the modernisation process was a
fisher-owned fleet consisting of thousands of small and
medium-sized vessels. Better economic returns and public
funded technological innovation were the main drivers of this
change. Historians characterise the motorisation of the coastal
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fleet as the “industrial revolution” of the Norwegian fishery
sector. Amotorised fleet led to increased mobility and produc-
tivity. The vessels could now reach new, more distant, fishing
grounds, and consequently became less dependent on the va-
garies of the weather. Another result of mobility was increased
competition among buyers and consequently less dependence
of fishers on particular buyers. On the other hand,
motorisation created more debt for fishers, and hence
vulnerability.
Stagnation of the international economy after the First
World War and the financial collapse on Wall Street hit the
Norwegian fishery sector hard because of its dependence on
export markets. All those involved in fisheries lost out signif-
icantly because of price collapses within the most important
stock fish (dried fish) and salted fish markets. Fishers tended
to have to carry the heaviest burden because losses were sim-
ply transferred to them. Moreover, there was a tendency to-
wards protectionism in international fish trade with the intro-
duction of customs and import quotas.
This was the case because several nations increased their
own catching capability in order to become self-sufficient as
opposed to buying fish from outside. German and British
trawl fishing grew significantly in the 1920s and 1930s.
Both countries started targeting the same Barents Sea cod.
Trawl boats from both these countries often damaged the
long-lines and nets set by Norwegian fishers which
triggered a strong opposition against foreign trawlers
(Christensen 1991; Hovland et al., 2014).
The situation worsened for the small-scale fishers of the
northernmost counties when the Russian Revolution put an
end to the traditional, so called Pomor trade (Niemi 1992;
Finstad and Lajus 2012; Nielsen 2014). Russian ships, during
spring, used to sail from the north-western region of Russia to
the coast of northern Norway. The Russians brought rye, sug-
ar, hemp rope, and other goods, which they bartered for fresh
fish that was cured directly on board. This seasonal trade was
very important because during summer the conditions for pro-
duction of stock-fish were bad. The Pomor ships offered the
fishing households an alternative trade channel to the local
fish merchants. When this trade ceased, they lost one of their
most important livelihood sources.
The crisis in the Norwegian post-WWI economy was not
limited to the fishing communities. The country witnessed a
high unemployment rate among industrial workers who when
they lost their jobs often started to fish, as the fishery was open
access and the entrance costs were low. Hiring open row-boats
was possible for almost everyone; so too buying bait and a
hand-line. In the early 1930s, there were more than 30,000
people involved in the seasonal Lofoten fishery, which was a
record high (Jentoft and Kristoffersen 1989; Hovland 2014).
Such a situation of an overpopulated fishery with simple
catch technology is known as the “primitivisation process” in
Norwegian fishery history (Bull 1991:160–168). The many
newcomers caused falling raw fish prices that now had to be
distributed to a larger number of people. Buyers and exporters
were thus able to lower prices. Fishers often returned home
from the Lofoten fishery at the end of the season poorer than
when they arrived there.
Lower prices meant that fishers had to work longer hours
and take more risks during bad weather to maintain the same
income level. They simply had to catch more. However, in-
creased fishing aggravated the crisis as more fish in the market
further depressed prices. A better strategy in the long run to
maintain income levels was collective organization. In 1926,
fishers established the Norwegian Fishers’ Association (NFA)
(Hallenstvedt and Dynna 1976; Hallenstvedt 1982;
Christensen and Hallenstvedt 2005). This was the first nation-
wide organization for professional fishers, almost three de-
cades after Norwegian farmers and industrial workers had
taken similar actions. The miserable economic situation of
Norwegian fisheries was from the start the priority issue.
Since then the organization has played an important role in
representing Norwegian fishers in the policy process as a con-
sultative partner with the government. Internal strife between
small- and large scale fisher members led to a breakout and the
establishment of the Norwegian Coastal Fishermen’s
Association in 1987 (Fig. 1).
Another early example of collective action was the forma-
tion in 1927 by herring fishers in western Norway of a sales-
organization called Storsildlaget (Christensen and
Hallenstvedt 1990:29–36). This organization attempted to cre-
ate a fishers’ cartel so as to control prices vis-à-vis buyers in
this particular fishery. The organization received legal protec-
tion in 1930 with the passing of the Herring Act. The Act
stated that sale of herring from fishers to processors was
prohibited outside the mandated sales-organization and that
the terms of sale were to be set by the same organization.
This arrangement was to become the legislative and organiza-
tional benchmark for the fisheries sector as a whole including
that of the cod fisheries.
The cod fishers of northern Norway bore the heaviest bur-
den of the market crisis within fisheries. Prior to the Lofoten
season in 1930, attempts were made by the government to
reach a voluntary agreement with buyers for a fixed minimum
price level “in first hand” (Christensen and Hallenstvedt
1990:38–42), but the effort failed. A turning point came in
1936, when the Parliament adopted an arrangement for a guar-
anteed minimum support price for fishers including state sub-
sidies so as to cover any losses incurred (Christensen and
Hallenstvedt 1990:55). The immediate reason for the govern-
ment’s intervention in fish sales was the closure of the stock-
fish export to Italy, one of the most important markets. A total
breakdown in this market put pressure on the Norwegian au-
thorities to act.
The arrangement was a breakthrough for fishers. For the
first time, they could prepare for a season knowing what raw
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fish prices would be. However, the fishers also knew very well
that this was only a temporary measure dependent on
Parliament’s continued approval of subsidies. One weakness
of the agreement was that it was limited to sales of cod for
stock-fish and salt−/clip-fish production. In some fishing vil-
lages, export of iced fresh fish made a small but significant
economic contribution to both fishers and buyers; there was
however no government support for this. Other important spe-
cies such as haddock, halibut, and coalfish, were also not part
of the scheme.
In 1937, a fisher's strike broke out in the town Vardø in
Finnmark County (Christensen and Hallenstvedt 1990:70–
76). The fishers claimed that the minimum support price sys-
tem should be sanctioned by law. That a strike broke out here
was no coincidence. Vardøwas then one of the most important
fishing towns in northern Norway, located strategically close
to rich fishing grounds. The town housed a number of fish
buyers and export firms and was the centre of an important
spring seasonal fishery, based on cod (that fed on capelin). In
addition to Vardø fishers, every year many visitors took part in
this fishery. In the period 1935 to 1939, the participation var-
ied between 9000 and 21,000 (Finstad 1993:59). The strike
made an impression on the central authorities. Consequently,
the government accelerated its effort to find a solution to the
fishers’ poor economic situation.
Finally, in 1938, after many years of struggle to find a
solution to the price issue, the Raw Fish Act was adopted
(Hallenstvedt 1982; Christensen and Hallenstvedt 1990;
Grytås 2013b; Hersoug et al., 2015). However, before the
draft law was presented to the Parliament, the government
required a referendum. All active fishers from the county of
Sogn og Fjordane and north of it were asked whether or not
they would approve of a mandated organization buying and
selling all raw fish on their behalf (Christensen and
Hallenstvedt 1990:87–88).
The response was overwhelming. About 22,000 fishers cast
their vote, and between 91 and 96% of fishers in the four
northernmost counties welcomed such an organization playing
the role of seller as mandated by the RFA (Christensen and
Hallenstvedt 1990:105). The legislator, i.e. the Parliament,
had a solid mandate from the group that the lawmeant to serve.
Simultaneously, with the completion of the formal legislative
process, the NFSO was founded in November, 1938, by repre-





Fig. 1 The legislation and organization history of fishing in Norway
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The RFA would never have seen the light of day without
coordinated action by fishers and active support of the gov-
ernment. Counterfinality was avoided by concerted effort.
From a broader perspective, however, the new act was in line
with contemporary trends. The 1930s represented a farewell to
orthodox economicmarket principles in many countries. First,
Keynesian corporatism with elements of protectionism re-
placed liberal private capitalism in western economies. The
state became a more active participant in the economy both
through planning and direct intervention.
In Norway, the RFA turned the tables in the fishing industry
as it shifted the bargaining power from the buyers to the fish-
ers. No wonder, therefore, that buyers and exporters contested
the law from the very beginning through condemnation and
resistance. This, however, had no impact although opposition
to the RFA is still very much alive. Notwithstanding opposi-
tion to the RFA, the law has undoubtedly had positive effects
not only for fishers but also for other participants in the value
chain, contributing to stable conditions for processors and
exporters. No less important was the fact that the law was an
incentive for exporters to becomemore proactive and efficient
in the final market, which resulted in larger revenues for the
entire industry and the country as a whole (Hallenstvedt
1982).
The Raw Fish Act – Content and mandate
The Norwegian Parliament made the 1938 Act permanent in
December 1951, a delay caused by the WWII when Norway
was under German occupation and the Norwegian cabinet
resided in London. The Act has since then undergone some
changes. This includes removing the provision that gives
sales-organizations the authority to license buyers (Hersoug
et al., 2015). The main principles, however, have survived
until this day. Thus fishers’ power in terms of their transac-
tions with buyers has been maintained. Section 2 of the Act
highlights the continued power of sales-organizations:
“The Kingmay decide that the processing, sale or export
of raw fish … or products thereof shall be prohibited
regardless of where the fish is caught if first-sale of the
raw fish has not taken place through or with the approval
of a fishermen’s sales-organization whose statues have
been approved by the Ministry concerned. Sale by an
approved sales-organization is regarded as first-sale.
Purchase of and settlement for raw fish fished on a share
or percentage basis by owners of vessels, owners of gear
or other co-partners is also regarded as first sale.” (http://
extwprlegs1.fao.org/docs/pdf/nor13984E.pdf).
This principle gives a fisher sales-organization both a mo-
nopoly right and a clear mandate. By giving the sales-
organization an exclusive right to trade raw marine fish, the
Act makes it illegal for fishers to sell the catch outside the
organization directly to a private buyer and for a buyer to
purchase a catch from other than the sales-organization. Free
riding is therefore banned.
The “freedom” that Garret Hardin talks about (see above) is
ruled out. Without this legal provision, it is likely that the
sales-organization would have disintegrated, as the parties
would have opted out if opportune, a possibility that would
have severely weakened the organization’s ability to fulfil its
role, i.e. to stabilise prices.
Furthermore, in section 3, the relationship between fishers,
the sales-organization and the state is outlined:
“The Ministry concerned may under section 2 of this
Act approve statutes for sales-organizations of fisher-
men when the fishermen or owners of vessels or gear
can become members through direct membership, or
when membership can be obtained through fishing boat
crew, local sales-organization or through the fishermen’s
trade organization, and the sales-organization is formed
with limited liability and with an indefinite number of
fishermen” (http://extwprlegs1.fao.org/docs/pdf/
nor13984E.pdf).
The sales-organizations are owned by the fishers who
automatically become members through their regional in-
terest organizations (subsidiaries of the NFA) or directly as
personal members. The former is by far most common.
According to the law, only fishers or organizations of fish-
ers can be members. Regardless of their membership sta-
tus, and whether fishers are members at all, fishers still
have to sell their fish through the sales-organization and
on their terms.
Membership is limited to active fishers residing within the
geographical district covered by the particular sales-organiza-
tion. The governing board is elected amongst the fisher mem-
bers at the annual meeting. The state has one delegate who
participates at meetings and whose role it is to ensure that the
sales-organizations are operating within the law, for instance
to make sure that they are properly handling the delegated
responsibilities regarding resource control. The NFSO’s annu-
al meeting can have up to fifty delegates, who for the most part
represent various fisher organizations in the districts that
NFSO covers.
“The herring sales-organization” (Noregs Sildesalgslag),
which covers the whole country, specialises in pelagic fish
(herring, mackerel and capelin). There are five other sales-
organizations for all other wild fish species. In 1980, there
were more than twice as many of them. However, since then
some of these sales-organizations have merged both in the cod
and the pelagic sector across the breadth of the country (see
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Table 1). In 2012, the NFSO processed 160,000 catches from
4430 vessels to 190 fishing industries, most of the latter being
exporters. Table 1 reveals considerable differences in the scale
of operations between sales-organizations in terms of sales
volumes and staff numbers.
The law further states that the organization shall be entitled
to levy a fee on the first-sale of all fish and products in order to
cover the costs incurred by running the organization and ad-
ministering sales operations, something that is subject to ap-
proval by the Ministry. Section 4 grants the sales-organization
the authority to determine the terms of trade with the buyer,
including the minimum price of the raw fish, which shall be
fixed at a level that takes the price at the end market into
consideration. If fishers were allowed to circumvent the
sales-organization and sell directly to the buyer, this authority
would be undermined. The sales-organizations and their pro-
cessor counterpart organization hold negotiations over the
first-hand prices several times a year. Should they not reach
agreement, the sales-organization can unilaterally set the min-
imum price, which both the seller and buyer are obliged to
respect. The two parties, however, are free to negotiate a
higher price than that determined by the sales-organization,
as when market suggests that the price can be higher. This
also happens when there is competition for fish among pro-
cessors and the market price is high. It is not uncommon that
the actual raw fish price is considerably higher than the min-
imum price.
Section 5 also grants the sales-organization the authority
“to impose a temporary prohibition on or order restrictions on
fishing” when “required by market conditions, or to achieve
an appropriate utilization of catches.” This rule ensures that
the sales-organization is delegated regulatory authority be-
yond simply the raw fish price issue to include concerns such
as the extent of catches that can be sold to specific buyers
outside a particular community or region when there is a glut
in the local market and local capacity to buy were too low.
The organization can even mandate that fishing is periodi-
cally prohibited. Notably, this regulatory function is not for
resource management but to avoid gluts in the raw fish sales
and ensure that fishers can find a ready buyer nearby. It can of
course be argued that this management function has an indirect
effect on the harvest. According to the law, the sales-
organization can also impose quotas on their members, even
if they rarely do.
However, with the introduction of quota regimes in the
1990s, alongside resource management, sales-organizations
have acquired a broader mandate to be part of fisheries man-
agement that previously was the preserve of the government
(Hersoug 2006; Hersoug et al., 2015).
Sales-organizations have complete data needed to calculate
harvest quotas since they are in charge of trading. The organiza-
tions register the time and place of all species caught and deliv-
ered, as well as their quantities. This management function is not
something the sales-organizations took on themselves, but a
function that they were ready and capable of doing. Hence, the
government saw in the sales-organizations a means by which to
ensure that both total and individual quotas are not exceeded.
This important function needed to be stated in the RFA. A
new section was incorporated in the law. The provision to
include this new function was stated as follows in the repre-
sentation to Parliament (Ot.prp. no. 20, 2007-2008, p.134):
“The sales-organizations have good knowledge of the chal-
lenges facing the government and fishers in the daily manage-
ment of the fisheries resources and the control of the harvest.”
This new management function helped create a co-
management system in which sales-organizations were given
a broader mandate than the 1951 Raw Fish Act originally
instituted. This change was first codified in the 2008 Ocean
Resources Act and reiterated most recently in the revised Raw
Fish Act of 2013, where paragraph 17 reads: “The govern-
ment can instruct the sales-organizations to control the accu-
racy of the catch information even if the catch does not relate
to the sales-right of the sales-organization (our translation,
RFA 2013).” Further on, the ministry can describe and regu-
late how this task should be carried out.
Discussion
It is a general lesson to be noted (Holm 1995) that although the
circumstances that exist at the time of the formation of an
organization may have changed, the initial organizational
Table 1 Fishing Sales-Organizations in Norway (2013)
Organizations Established Staff Sales volume tonnes Sales value 1000 NOK Web address
Norwegian Herring Sales- Organizations 1936 45 538,231 1,884,574 www.sildelaget.no/en
Norwegian Fishers’ Sales-Organization 1938 60 711,574 5,744,341 http://www.rafisklaget.no/
Skagerakfish 1947 5 8294 301,686 http://www.skagerakfisk.no/
Rogaland Fishing Sales- Organization 1946 2 5752 138,638 http://www.rogfisk.no/
West-Norway’s Fishing Sales- Organization 1988 5 32,612 40,000 http://www.vnf.no/
Sunnmøre and Romsdal Fishing Sales- Organizations 1945 13 188,000 1,700,000 http://www.surofi.no
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design often remains largely unaltered. To understand how the
organization looks and operates today, one must therefore go
back to the time of its establishment and how those who cre-
ated it were thinking. This we have done in this paper. Given
this observation, it is likely that over time a gap may appear
between what the organization can offer and what the envi-
ronment has reason to expect from it.
As this gap unfolds, the organization then becomes increas-
ingly irrelevant and obsolete in spite of the fact it has been able
to survive. The organization may have solved the problem it
was created to solve and hence has outlived itself. Nonetheless
the organization remains. In some instances, vested interests
may be sufficient to ensure that the organization persists even
if the original reason for its establishment is no longer valid.
Organizations may persist but the legitimation for it changes,
as when secondary effects become the primary ones or latent
functions manifest themselves. The organization may survive
because of resistance to change by powerful individuals who
are reluctant to give up their power or see benefits distributed
in different ways. Such a scenario often unfolds with collec-
tive goods.
However, organizations are not necessarily stuck in the past
and unable to change, i.e. they may indeed adapt and modern-
ise. What remains of the old organization may disappear over
time, while a new, reinvented organization emerges. New
goals and new functions may be added to the organization’s
original portfolio. The constellation of members may change,
bringing in new ideas and concerns. Organizations are typi-
cally “political coalitions” where members and other stake-
holders constantly negotiate ends and means (March 1962).
Thus the ability of an organization to adapt and survive is a
function of internal as well as external factors.
Organizations may remain unchallenged as long as its en-
vironment is stable, but become flexible and adaptive if the
environment is volatile. Organizations with a collective man-
date such as the Norwegian fishers’ sales-organizations, will
be challenged from the outside, by the public at large. Such
organizations are not a private matter for members only. They
are not totally autonomous but rather a part of the overall
Norwegian fisheries governing system within which the state
also has a crucial role. The legally mandated functions of the
sales-organizations have therefore from time to time been
scrutinised by the Fisheries Ministry and discussed by
Parliament. The push to change sales-organizations has often
been initiated from this level.
The number of fishers’ sales-organization has been reduced
over the years, but through a process of merging that has not
created a vacuum. Organizations are now fewer but larger and
more professional. They still cover the fishery sector in the
whole country (see Fig. 2), and deal only with the fisheries
capture industry. Without their monopsony/monopoly status,
they would be vulnerable to exit and, hence, less effective, i.e.
if fishers and processors would be allowed to operate outside
the system. In this sense, they are different from the Producer
Organizations within the fisheries industry of the European
Union, where membership is voluntary.
It is nevertheless quite remarkable that the Raw Fish Act
and the sales-organizational system have remained intact until
this day, despite constant pressure from groups (processors
and exporters) within the industry to undermine them because
they saw their interests threatened (Hersoug et al., 2015).
These attempts to undermine them have to some extent made
it necessary for the sales-organizations to redefine their pur-
pose and acquire new functions to defend their base. Fishers in
Norway have been able to keep control of first hand raw fish
sales because of sales-organizations.
In the age of neoliberalism and resource management,
these organizations continue to play a crucial role in the over-
all governance system. This is explained by the general sup-
port the RFA enjoys in the fishing communities but also by the
fact that the sales-organizations are powerful and wealthy or-
ganizations. Finally, there is a perception amongst fishers that
the problem that these organizations were established to ad-
dress in the first place may well resurface again if they are not
there.
Norwegian fishers have become fewer and wealthier, and
the industry is no longer the backbone of coastal communities
that it used to be. Thus, the RFA has lost some of its social and
political significance. It was instituted to deal with a situation
where fishers were many and poor. Still, the law retains its
symbolic force as the “constitution” of small-scale fisheries. It
is taken as given and an “objective reality” of Norwegian
fisheries (Berger and Luckmann 1967). One does not need-
lessly alter such laws without considerable political costs.
Although representatives of the processing industry have
frequently voiced harsh criticism against the RFA and the
monopoly power it grants the sales-organizations in setting
the raw fish price, only one political party in Norway, the
Progress Party (“Fremskrittspartiet”), has ever suggested that
the Act should be abolished. This party is now in government
with the Conservative party, and has the fisheries minister.
However, in the official political platform, there is no such
suggestion about the abolishment of the act.
Over the years, reforms have occurred, such as in 1998 the
removing the authority of the sales-organizations to license
buyers, but the law by and large remains intact, and thus con-
tinues to empower the primary producers, i.e. the fishers, in
their transactions with buyers. This arrangement is quite
unique in the world of small-scale fisheries and may provide
a more ‘global’ lesson. If a fish buyer in Norway wants to
increase his profit, he cannot do it on the back of another
fisher; instead he would have to pursue it at the end-market
with the retailer, exporter, or consumer. In that way the RFA
was meant to vitalise the entire value chain and discourage
“lazy monopolies” in the processing and export chain
(Hallenstvedt 1982). In other words, the RFA was not just
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meant to serve fishers, but was intended to also improve the
profitability of the fisheries industry and the Norwegian econ-
omy as a whole.
Notably, the Norwegian fisheries value distribution chain is
a layered system of horizontal integration. The sales-
organizations have a mandate and a function in the value
distribution chain that stops at the dock-side (Holm 1995).
Processors and exporters have similar organizations with
whom sales-organizations negotiate, but if a settlement is not
agreed to, the sales-organization can dictate the price. The
layered structure, and the RFA and the sales-organizations
which the law mandates, has also been kept intact by legisla-
tion. The Participation Act, which principles were introduced
already in the early 1940s, ruled that only active fishers are
allowed to own fishing vessels in Norway. This is by and large
still the system, even if legal reforms have allowed investment
by processors in the fishing fleet. This happened first in the
trawler fleet in the 1950s, when an exception from the general
rule was made where fish processors were given permission to
own fishing vessels. In 2013, the Act was changed, and now
non-active fishers, including processors, can now own up to
49% of the vessel. This means that the majority interest con-
tinue to rest with the active fishers.
Fishers may be competitors in the fishing grounds, but they
share a common interest in a high product price in transactions
that are externalised (Williamson 1975). Collective action is
therefore in their interest, and the fact that fishers have a sim-
ilar background culturally and economically helps facilitate
coordinated action. Although owned by fishers and managed
in line with the classic cooperative principles of one member-
one vote, the sales-organizations are not producer coopera-
tives that also engage in processing and marketing operations,
thus making the transaction of raw fish at the dock side an
internal affair within the same company. Still, some of these
organizations have subsidiaries that are involved in other ac-
tivities, such as fish processing. However, in recent years sev-
eral of the sales-organizations have terminated such additional
activities and concentrated solely on first-hand sales, which
was always their core activity anyway.
The Second World War led to much of destruction, also in
the fishing communities, and fishers were in need of landing
facilities that had been destroyed. Initiatives to form producer




cooperatives were taken with support from sales-
organizations but few of them stayed operative for long
(Otnes 1980; Revold 1980). The reasons for their failure are
several and complex, but there is little doubt that the horizon-
tal integration instituted by the NRA and the sales-
organizations conflicted with the vertical integration of pro-
ducer cooperatives. When fishers, by means of the NFA con-
trolled the price in a way that secured their income, it did not
make much sense to pursue a vertical integration for the same
purpose, i.e. move into processing. One problem was that
processing and export would require a kind of expertise that
fishers did not have. The other problem was that such a move
would mean that fishers would be at both sides of the table
when prices were negotiated and fixed.
A high raw fish price, which was in the interest of the
fishers, would not have been in the interest of the processing
cooperative, as it would reduce its financial capacity. The
fisher members found themselves in a double bind; whose
interest should they serve; fishers as fishers or fishers as co-
operative owners?
The layered system represented a “cleaner” model than a
mixed horizontal and vertical system; it also did not challenge
the already well-established and powerful buyer/export inter-
ests more than necessary, and who with the Salt-fish Act of
1932 already had formed their collective organization and
granted legal protection (Holm 1995). Buyers/exporters were
struggling to accept the role of taker. In the cod fisheries,
exporters were collectively organized prior to the fishers – in
contrast to the herring fisheries where vertical integration was
more advanced (Hallenstvedt 1982).
The origin of the RFA and the fishers’ sales-organizations
is important. They came about as part of a broad-based grass-
root labour movement combined with a proactive and en-
abling state government. It all started with the establishment
of the Norwegian Fishers Association in 1926, followed by a
series of initiatives aimed at strengthening the livelihoods of
small-scale fishers and their communities (Fig. 1). The RFA
and the sales-organizations emerged from below and within;
they were not imposed upon fishers.
They were organizations of rather than for small-scale fish-
ers with government playing a supportive role. The govern-
ment no doubt saw the need for a less chaotic and ad-hoc
organization as the fishing industry was after all one
of Norway’s most important exporter. What happened in the
fishery was therefore of national significance. The state did
not take a paternalistic position but rather listened to the voice
of the fishers. The same labour movement that had brought
forth the RFA also had a strong representation in the
Parliament and from 1935 onwards actually was the base of
the government.
After the Second World War, the government decided to
financially support the fisheries. The systemwas formalised in
1964 when the Norwegian Fishers Association (NFA) and the
Ministry of Fisheries signed an agreement. It gave the NFA
the right to represent the entire industry in negotiations with
the government in an attempt to secure fishers an income
comparable with other groups in society such as industrial
workers. The government ended up giving subsidies mostly
to enhance raw fish prices (Jentoft and Mikalsen 1987). When
the market could not adequately provide for the fishers’ econ-
omy, the state compensated.
In the beginning of the 1990s, however, due to a stronger
market orientation, fisheries subsidies were questioned, more
so because of the overcapacity problem within the fisheries.
The European Union, with which Norway had an extended
agreement, banned distortion of competition. As a result, gov-
ernment support was reduced and then removed (Hernes
1999; Finstad 2014).
For these historical reasons, the state even today enjoys
overall legitimacy within the fishing population and the pop-
ulation at large (Skirbekk and Grimen 2012). The government
is seen as part of the solution rather than the “enemy”. When
government is perceived as a constructive force, the
governability of the fisheries sector is enhanced because it
makes it possible to introduce rules and regulations that oth-
erwise would have been difficult to implement and enforce.
Thus, when the government introduced the new quota system
in 1990, which effectively did away with the open access
nature of small-scale fisheries, and launched strict measures
to combat illegal and unreported fishing, it received reluctant
support as opposed to fierce opposition from within the fish-
ing population. The government could also mobilise the sales-
organization for this purpose.
In contrast, when the government launched policies that led
to a less proactive role for the state in fisheries, theymet strong
opposition. It is largely for this reason that the introduction of
market-based fisheries management measures such as ITQs
has been rather slow in Norway as compared to other Nordic
countries such as Iceland and Denmark. It has simply not been
politically possible to undertake full-scale privatization of
common pool resources, at least not as yet (Hannesson 2013).
Conclusion
The fishing industry was always crucial for Norwegian econ-
omy and society, even for the way the country is settled.
Today, seafood export, which includes farmed salmon, is sec-
ond after oil. Norway is also one of the world’s major ex-
porters of fish. The home market consumes just a minimal
volume (about 5 %) of fish caught and farmed. With fish
exports being so important, transactions must be smooth and
speedy, which the fishers’ sales-organizations help to ensure.
Exporting fish is, however, less complicated than exporting
institutions; institutions cannot be easily copied and
implemented in other settings which Norway in fact tried to
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do in Kerala, India, in the 1950s, but without much success.
As Kurien (1985) argues in a study of the Kerala experience,
there is an important difference between the organization of
and for fishers. The former was the case as a result of the RFA
and fishers’ sales-organizations in Norway in the 1930s and
beyond, whereas the latter was what Norway tried to do in
Kerala in the 1950s, but with little success (Pharo 2000).
The social and political context within which new organi-
zations such as fishers’ sales-organizations emerge is always
particular to time and place. Context differs but matters, even
when counterfinality and second-order collective action prob-
lems occur. Context must therefore be taken into account
when explaining why and how such organizations evolve
and what shape they assume. General models, like
counterfinality, give intuitive meaning but they do not tell
the whole story. For that “thick description” (Geertz 1971) is
needed.
How likely is it that the RFA and the sales-organizations
that it legalises, would have been established in the current
situation in Norwegian fisheries? The answer to this question
is most probably ‘highly unlikely’. But to abolish this law, and
all the institutional structures that are derived from it, would
nevertheless be a major intervention that would circumvent
existing power-relations and change the way fisheries work
in Norway. Its very existence carries a lot of power, which
facilitates robustness against drastic political intervention.
This model of organization is incongruous to the neoliberal
trend that is currently sweeping Norwegian fisheries and those
of the rest of the Western world. Now, transactions are sup-
posed to be left to the free market with government playing a
less proactive role. In a competitive market, fishers do not see
themselves as “comrades in arms”, as they did to a greater
extent in the 1930s. The RFA and the system of mandated
fishers’ sales-organizations have survived until this day, but
their existence was never that solid and their future is uncer-
tain (Grytås 2013b).
There are strong forces inside and outside Norway’s fishing
industry that want to take away the legal right from the sales-
organizations to determine the minimum prices and the exclu-
sive ownership that fishers have of the organizations. There
are also those who disagree with the right sales-organizations
have to regulate and direct vessels, whereas some of the sales-
organizations have expressed that they are uncomfortable be-
ing asked to report on members who do not follow the quota
regulations (Grytås 2013b).
The RFA and the sales-organizations are vulnerable to po-
litical regime shifts, particularly from the right. And they are
also dependent on support from within the industry which
might evaporate with changing circumstances. The combina-
tion of these factors may well be devastating.
As of now, symbolism has trumped real-politics. The RFA
and the sales-organizations have been under pressure from the
very beginning despite the almost unanimous support they
have from the rank and file fisher members. Those in favour
of abolishing the Act and sales-organizations have not pre-
sented a sufficiently convincing alternative system. The law
has therefore changed little since 1938.
It stills enjoys support amongst most fishers, particularly
small-scale fishers in the north. These fishers’ sales-
organizations are powerful institutions with a strong voice in
Norwegian fisheries politics, and they are therefore not easily
toppled.Whether the RFA and the sales-organizations are sus-
tainable within an ITQ system is not at all clear even, if the
principle of owner-operated fishing fleet will be maintained.
One possibility is that the law would allow these organizations
themselves to become quota owners. But as yet that is not on
the cards.
Thus far, such vertical (upstream) integration is limited as
the legal principle has been that only active fishers can own
vessels. This rule, however, is now under threat from the same
interests that are critical of the RFA. Sales-organizations were
started to serve an independent, small-scale, owner-operated
and open-access fishery with the aim to secure the livelihoods
of economically and politically disadvantaged fishers who due
to their high number counted politically. Their voice had to be
reckoned with. Since 1990, the number of fishers in Norway
has drastically reduced for several reasons, one of them being
the quota system that has encouraged buy-outs.
Should that rule be abolished and the processors/buyers be
allowed to becamemajority owners of fishing vessels, which a
recent publish task force suggested, the RFA and the sales-
organization would be undermined, as the RFA and the
Participation Act are closely linked. The owner-operated fleet,
which the current legislation maintains, creates the foundation
of the layered system, and is a foundation of RFA and the
sales-organizations. It maintains the relationship and the sys-
tem of organised transaction between the independent seller
(fisher) and buyer (processor). It would not make much sense
with fishers and processors sitting on the same side of the
negotiating table, as it would turn the system into a classical
employer/employee relationship, and thus reverse the power-
relation to where it was before the RFAwas introduced in the
1930s. The NFSO and other sales-organization therefore were
in strong opposition to the recently published reform proposal,
which did not survive the vote in the Parliament in 2015.
Although unique in context and institutional design, the
RFA and the sales-organizations addressed a problem that
small-scale fishers are still experiencing all over the world;
one of poverty, marginalization and exploitation (Jentoft and
Eide 2011). As the weakest party of the fisheries value distri-
bution chain, small-scale fishers are typically price-takers in
transactions with buyers. The NFA and the sales-organizations
radically altered their predicament; they empowered fishers
and moved them out of poverty. But the RFA was not only
meant as a mechanism for income distribution. It was also
introduced as incentive for the whole industry to work harder
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in export markets so as to bring in larger revenues for the
entire industry and for the country as a whole whose economy
relied on the fishery.
It could be argued that the relevance of these institutions is
not restricted to Norway. Cooperative principles are valid re-
gardless of circumstances and have been implemented in fish-
eries in many countries. Collective action is always essential
to overcome problems within a fragmented industry.
Organizations of fishers, backed by law and a proactive state,
with a mission and a mandate to determine the basic condi-
tions under which transactions take place, is applicable to
other countries as well if the politics are conducive.
The poverty and marginalization that characterised
Norwegian fishing in the 1920s and 1930s, and which the
RFA and the sales-organizations were meant to eradicate is a
reality in many parts of the world today. Such institutions, if
they were to be introduced in other parts of the world would,
require a break with the neoliberal ideology now inspiring
fisheries reform all over the world. The future of Norwegian
fishers’ sales-organizations and their legal pillar involves an
ideological and political battle. They are offspring of social
democracy, grass-root power, and the ability of producers to
see the need for working together for a common good. But
their survival requires that they are able to move with the tide.
They must be responsive to new challenges.
The RFA and the sales-organizations were initiated at a
time when resources were not considered to be a limited re-
source. Rather, the situation was much the opposite. Fishers
had more to sell at times than buyers could absorb. They still
remained poor. Today, a key challenge is to make sure that the
resource base is not overexploited, which means that fishing
effort must be kept in check. Interestingly, the sales-
organizations are well positioned to play an important role in
such a governing system, by assuming necessary regulatory
functions in a co-governance system. At the end of the day, the
RFA and the sales-organizations depend on their ability to
remain relevant as part of a governing system that has a social
responsibility that extends beyond value chain transaction.
As a governance model, the Norwegian Raw Fish Act and
the sales-organizations that the law facilitated, and the
Participation Act that in addition are foundational for the fish-
ing industry are not outdated. They were introduced to address
the same problems that small-scale fisheries are facing in
many instances around the world: poverty, vulnerability and
marginalization. And who can say that if those institutions
were dismantled in Norway, the problems that originally trig-
gered these institutions would not resurface again? It is not for
us to say how relevant the Norwegian model is for other coun-
tries. Those who would say no must also explain why not.
What the Norwegian example does suggest, however, is that
if there is will to foster institutions and organizations that
make a difference to small-scale fishers, to the industry, and
to the entire fisheries governance system, there is a way.
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